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SKILL, VOICE, AND COMPETITIVENESS: 
INTEGRATING FIELD RESEARCH INTO LABOR 
ECONOMICS 
Kazuo Koike 
1. Two Aims 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, 
field research used to be a mainstay in labor economics 
(see, for instance, Doeringer and Piore). As more 
and more quantitative methodologies became widely 
available to applied economics researchers, field 
research became a forgotten trade among most 
labor economics. In recent years, however, interest 
in field research has been rekindled among a new 
generation of labor economists (Ichniowski, et 
al.[1997], Hamilton, et al. [2003], and Kato and 
Shu [2008]). I have been conducting extensive field 
research in a variety of workplaces in multiple 
countries over five decades. Using some of my 
recent field research projects, this paper demonstrates 
vividly the value of field research as an important 
complementary methodology in labor economics.  
 
In my view, field research has three notable 
advantages. First, some key variables in labor 
economics, such as worker skill, are difficult to 
quantify, and field research proves to be critically 
important in understanding such variables. Second, 
field research can provide vital insights on the 
actual mechanism through which worker skill 
affects productivity, and exactly what kinds of 
worker skill are particularly productivity-enhancing. 
Such insights will help policy makers and 
practitioners develop and implement strategies to 
enhance competitiveness at the micro level as well 
as at the macro level. Third, field research when 
conducted effectively provides fresh insights which 
will help economic theorists develop a new theory.  
 
    The second and related purpose of this paper 
is to explain the theory of “intellectual skill” which 
I developed using insights from my own field 
research in diverse workplaces in multiple 
countries over several decades. In so doing, I hope 
to be able to elaborate on my main message (the 
value of field research in labor economics). Let me 
begin with explaining what I mean by “intellectual 
skills”.  
2. Intellectual Skills 
Take for example a final assembly line in car 
industry, say Toyota. A quick glance at those 
assembly line workshops gives inexperienced 
observers a false impression that skill requirements 
for those assemblers are quite low. A closer look at 
the same workshops for at least two hours reveals 
quite a different picture. There appear to be two 
kinds of operations which production workers 
perform; usual operations and unusual operations. 
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Usual operations are just routine and repetitive, 
say, to attach a left forward door of Corolla every 
60 seconds. No skills are required for conducting 
these operations. And people tend to imagine that 
all operations in the final assembly line are of this 
kind. 1) 
 
Yet, a longer and careful observation reveals a 
variety of unusual operations, which occur far more 
frequently than imagined. Unusual operations 
handle “problems” and “changes” that are not 
always predicted fully in advance. A set of skills 
required to perform such unusual operations 
effectively are called “intellectual skills”. In my 
view, it is those “intellectual skills” that make a 
significant difference in workplace productivity 
even if similar equipments are used.  
 
The “problems” which are solved in unusual 
operations are not fully known beforehand in terms 
of their nature, timing and magnitude. A defect in 
product quality is a good example. We cannot 
predict exactly what kind of defects will occur, 
when they will occur, and how crucial they are for 
productivity. If we had been able to predict all of 
these problems beforehand accurately, then we 
could have designed a computer program to identify 
and to handle product defects efficiently, so that no 
workers skills are necessary. 
 
    The “changes” which are dealt with in unusual 
operations are also uncertain in their extent and 
timing, although their nature is known in advance. 
An obvious example is a change in output. The 
demand for products often changes, almost 
unexpectedly, both in timing and degree. If 
production workshops cannot effectively adjust to a 
change in demand, many unsold cars will pile up in 
the stockyard, which would not only be a large 
additional cost to the firm, but would also waste 
scarce resources of the society. 
 
    To explain the theory of “intellectual skills”, 
we will focus on two specific examples of unusual 
operations (for brevity, we discuss only two specific 
examples. For a more comprehensive list of 
extraordinary operations, see the appendix).  
3. The Easiest Case: Identifying Incorrect 
Parts or Missed Parts 
3.1 What Are Revealed by In-depth Field Research 
Least Costly On-line Identification 
On a final assembly line in the car industry, for 
example, the most visible, and hence the easiest to 
identify, defects are incorrect parts being attached 
or required parts not being attached. Although 
these are seemingly simplest defects, they are not 
easy to be identified during a flow of operations, 
since the cycle time, or process time, of an 
operator is as short as around 60 seconds in an 
ordinary situation. (The cycle time becomes longer 
when markets are slack, as explained in the 
appendix.) Within such a short period of only 60 
seconds, it is not easy for an operator on the line to 
identify those defects which occurred earlier while 
engaging in their own tasks. 
 
It may be argued that inspection staff, who 
locate at inspection stations in the middle or at the 
end of the assembly line, can fulfill this task than 
the operators themselves on the line who are busy 
with their own tasks. However, an inspection is far 
more costly than assembly-line workers in 
recognizing defects in products. This is firstly 
because a defect becomes excessively difficult to 
be identified later in the assembly line, since many 
parts that have been attached later conceal the 
original defect. 
 
Even when the defect is identified during later 
production stage, rectifying it requires far more 
time and hence increased costs. The simplest 
defects, such as incorrect parts being attached, 
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usually necessitate a series of operations to replace 
the defective part with the correct one, because 
many parts that have been assembled after the 
original defect was made have to be disassembled 
or overhauled. This is the second reason. 
 
The consequent damage to productivity is 
enormous, when this is compared with the case in 
which the operator on the very job next to the one 
that caused the defect find the defects, or at the 
latest, during the last job in the workshop where 
the defect occurred. It is simple because not many 
other parts conceal the original defect. And even if 
no time is allowed for the operator to replace the 
defected part, he or she can put a red tape to 
indicate the defected part, and hence it takes only 
a couple of minutes for other workers to replace it 
at a shortest gap of the assembly line.  
 
Yet, this is subject to an important condition 
that the operator on the assembly line has 
capability to identify the defect in such a short 
cycle time busy with one’s own operations to be 
conducted. Then, what is the content of the 
capability? Is it simple commitment to the job or 
loyalty to the company or the work group? 
 
Broad Experience in the Workshop 
A series of in-depth interviews with veteran 
foremen who know the situation of the workshop 
most intimately disclose that the best way to 
acquire the know-how for identifying incorrect 
parts or missing parts is to have had experience in 
working on the preceding jobs in the same 
workshop. The reason is clear: to identify the 
defect in such a short time as 60 seconds, 
knowledge of the normal situation without any 
defect is indispensable. If an assembly worker has 
this knowledge, a glance is enough to identify 
something as incorrect. 
 
Work experience in the subsequent jobs in the 
workshop also significantly promotes a workers’ 
capability to inspect for defects. While an operator 
is carrying out the subsequent jobs in the workshop, 
he or she becomes more aware of what points in the 
operations should be carefully attended in order to 
decrease defects. When the worker is deployed in 
the preceding jobs with experience of subsequent 
jobs, minimum defects naturally follow.  
 
A simply broad experience is not enough, 
however. Without an experience of the job for a 
long period say not a couple of days but for several 
months, it is almost infeasible to identify the 
defects at a glance. If we extend this logic 
reasonably, it is natural for a worker to experience 
almost main jobs (ten to fifteen jobs) in the 
workshop to acquire the know-how to identify the 
defects. Here we can obtain an effective measure of 
workers skills by a broad experience. And it is 
necessary to require not a short period, say 7-8 




Yet, a crucial question might be raised: how 
frequently these defects in product quality occur, 
so as to affect the productivity significantly? This 
crucial question consists of a very difficult part to 
answer and of not so difficult one. To begin with the 
not so difficult part, the probability of incorrect 
part or missed parts could be unexpectedly high. 
The major reason of suspecting such high 
probability is, as well known in those scholars who 
study the Japanese car industry, due to an 
extremely large variety in the kinds of products. A 
final assembly line engaged in manufacturing one 
brand as Corolla has to handle an extremely large 
variety in the parts. To take for instance the engine 
for one brand of Corolla, there is difference in the 
capacity of engines such as 1200, 1500, 1800cc and 
so on. In addition, a further variety of engine 
follows. The emission regulation differs by region 
even within the US: stricter in California than say, 
Texas. Hence the design of engine differs even by 
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region that has to be assembled along one assembly 
line. A long series is needed to refer to an 
extremely large variety of other parts that follow. 
Driving apparatus of shifting gears has another 
variety as 3 shifts, 4 shifts and five shifts, in 
addition to the difference between manual and 
automatic operations. And if we take into account 
of the difference in color, the number of difference 
in the mixture of all these varieties in parts is so 
enormous that it is almost inevitable for workers on 
the final assembly line to cause incorrect parts 
and/or missed parts even though a particular slip 
indicating each part is attached.  
 
    The other part of the question is much more 
difficult to address. Looking back the cases that we 
have discussed above in detail such as the 
importance of identifying the incorrect parts or 
missing parts within the workshop, it can easily be 
surmised that no official figure could be available 
even in the firm. So far as I know, the frequency 
data of defects available within the factory or firm 
are mostly confined to those identified by the 
inspection people at inspection stations on the 
assembly line. The figure of defects identified by 
the inspection people are discussed in the formal 
meeting consisting of managers and foremen in the 
department. In the meeting the foreman whose 
workshop has many defects identified by the 
inspection is strongly criticized and required to 
present the counter-measures how to decrease the 
defects. It is natural that this tough meeting prevents 
the foremen from referring to those defects that are 
identified and rectified within his workshop.  
 
I was presented with two rare opportunities to 
discern the true frequency of defects in Toyota 
production lines. One is that I happen to pick up a 
slip of memorandum noting the number of defects 
by character for a certain week, which is never 
reported in the formal meeting of the firm. The slip 
suggests unexpectedly frequent defects. The other 
is the actual figures of defects occurred in the 
workshop disclosed by some foremen. I was 
fortunately enough to conduct in-depth interviews 
with those veteran foremen who were near 
retirement, and hence who had no apprehension in 
stating the real situation in the workshop. The 
frequency of defects is surely by far higher than 
usually imagined. I did not quote these figures in 
my book published, in an apprehension of possible 
damage to the future career of the foremen. I 
simply described the frequency as “considerably 
large.”   
 
    The above story naturally suggests an 
enormous difference in productivity between the 
two cases; a. on-line identifying by operators, and 
b. identifying at the inspection stations by inspection 
people. This large gap can be understood when the 
above observation is compared with an ordinary 
analysis based on an ordinary field work. 
3.2  Ordinary Results by Ordinary Field Work 
Pitfalls in an Ordinary Field Research 
    An ordinary field research often conducts 
interviews with managers or engineers in a company 
meeting room only, not going to the shop floor. 
Even when interviewers visit the shop floor and talk 
with the foremen, mostly they are accompanied 
with managers. With managers accompanied, the 
foreman naturally tends to follow the formal policy 
of the firm, rather than candidly telling the shop 
floor practice.  
 
Taking for example Toyota, the formal policy 
of the firm on the way of dealing with problems is, 
when an operator finds something unusual, “to stop 
the line, to call for the supervisor, and to wait for 
his coming”. In other words, it is an imperative for 
an operator on the assembly line, not to deal with 
the problems by oneself, rather just to pull the 
‘andon’ string to call for the supervisor. 2) Managers 
as well as engineers would tell this formal story in 
the meeting room, and even the foreman on the 
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shop floor would state the similar story when he is 
accompanied by a manager or an engineer. And if 
this is to be the actual case, the line would stop so 
often that the efficiency of Toyota would be largely 
lowered than the fact. This could easily be surmised, 
when we think of the high frequency of defects on 
the line as stated above.  
 
    This formal policy had, in my understanding, 
two purposes originally. One is to identify and 
“visualize” the critical point of trouble in the flow 
of operations, so that the improvement could be 
efficiently invited. The other would be to prevent 
less skilled operators from being involved in work 
accidents, which are extremely costly not only for 
the worker oneself but also for the firm. Yet, 
practices on the shop floor have been continuously 
renewed, resulting in a large gap between the 
practice and the formal policy. 
 
    If a researcher is not aware of this gap, and yet 
tries to explain the relative high efficiency of 
Japanese assembly lines, then it is natural to 
overemphasize off-line problem-solving: famous as 
“Kaizen”, QC circle activities, and suggestion 
systems (Koike,2001). And this emphasis on 
off-line problem-solving consequently leads to a 
well established illusion that Japanese operators on 
an assembly line are subject to Taylorism, strict 
regulation by management. Although no doubt 
remains for a certain contribution to productivity 
by these off-line activities, no illusion can survive, 
once we remind the tremendous effects of handling 
even the easiest defects in product stated above. 
Before proceeding to the most demanding case, let 
me summarize the points for avoiding pitfalls in field 
research, though I am afraid they are too simple, 
yet not easy to implement. 
 
Measures to Avoid Pitfalls 
    To avoid pitfalls, first, it is imperative to 
conduct interviews with multiple informants even 
on the same issue, not jointly but separately for 
confirmation. To disclose the way of treating the 
defects of the product quality, for instance, we 
need to talk with not only managers or engineers, 
but also the foremen or those veteran workers who 
know the practice on the shop floor most. And it is 
to be noted that the place of interview should be 
the one where the interviewee is the master of the 
place such as a foreman in one’s own office. 
According to my own experience, the second or 
third interview may often afford this opportunity. 
 
    Second, it is important to conduct interviews 
with the same informant twice or more on different 
dates. Even if time allowed for second interview is 
as short as a half an hour, it is really precious. 
These multiple interviews not only help researchers 
clarify the ambiguous answers that are unavoidable 
in the method of interview, but also confirm the fact 
by asking slightly different questions. And most 
important is the informant’s relaxation or trust 
with the interviewer. Usually on the second 
interview, the informant is accustomed to the 
interviewer, in terms of knowing his interest and 
even trustworthiness, so that more fruitful answers 
are expected. 
 
Third, according to my own experience, 
questions are needed to be concrete as much as 
possible. Suppose we ask the way to deal with 
identifying defects in product, for example. A 
question how a worker on assembly line identifies 
incorrect part attached or missed part is by far 
better than a question simply asking in general how 
an operator identifies defects in product quality. It 
is because the latter general type of question 
largely depends on the interviewee’s 
understanding of the question and hence there 
might be large possibility of misunderstandings, or 
a danger to employ a different standard in 
answering the question. And once an answer has 
been obtained, it is vital to ask the recent 
illustrations, and how they were handled and what 
problems remained. In other words, it is important 
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not to stop the interview with a first answer, but 
rather to proceed for some knowledge sharing 
between the interviewee and the interviewer, which 
could afford an ample source of a new theory. 
 
Fourth, it is preferable to even inquire the 
interviewee’s reasoning why the problem occurred 
and how that was solved. When the interviewee is a 
veteran worker, his explanation would often be of 
extreme importance. And these answers of how and 
why can be an immense source of a new theory. 
4. The Most Demanding Cases 
4.1 Voice in the Design of a New Car Model 
Pilot Teams 
The most demanding working of intellectual 
skills is workers’ voice in the new design of 
product, as well as workers’ participation in the 
design of new production line. What follows are 
based on a comparative field research between Thai 
Toyota, NUMMI in the US, the UK Toyota and 
Toyota in Japan, during the period of 2002-2005, 
published as Koike [2008] in Japanese only. The 
focus here is on the workings of a “pilot team” of 
production workers, who are selected as being 
engaged in designing a new production line with 
production engineers as well as manufacturing 
engineers. Since similar groups can hardly be seen 
in other countries so far as I know, an explanation 
is indispensable. 
 
    A pilot team comprises one or two dozen 
members of production workers for one department 
as the final assembly, dependent on the stage of the 
process. Most members are of ten to fifteen years 
of experience as ordinary operators on the 
assembly line, none being supervisors, but assessed 
highly on the capability in dealing with changes and 
problems. Once they are selected, they are off-line 
for a half or one full year, mainly participate in the 
design of new production line in collaboration with 
engineers, and have voice in the design of a new car 
model  
 
    Let me start with observing their voice in the 
design of a new car model. At the stage of its 
conceptual design, members of the pilot team are 
requested to make comment on the conceptual 
design. According to field research that conducts a 
series of intensive interviews with production 
engineers as well as those veteran production 
workers who have been the member of the pilot 
team, the pilot team not only comments that this 
part of design is not easy for assembling and hence 
may cause more frequent defects, but also 
proposes even their own idea of modification of the 
design. The design engineers who are mostly with 
MA degree in engineering react to these comments 
faithfully: though the design engineers of the new 
product accept not all of these comments or 
proposals, they answer to these proposals with 
written documents stating the reasons why they do 
not accept these. Clearly the pilot team members 
are mostly high school graduates so that they have 
never been trained in the study on product design. 
And yet, why and how can they effectively not only 
comment but also propose some modification of the 
design?  
 
Broad Work Experience 
     There are two points to be noted. First, the 
comments and proposals by the pilot team are 
based on their experience of assembling the current 
model of car. Through conducting operations on 
the assembly line, they become aware of the fact 
that a certain part is not easy to assemble and 
accordingly apt to cause defects, and that a small 
change in the design can remarkably decrease the 
difficulties and defects.  
 
    These skills are not acquired by most workers 
even with long experience; rather many cannot 
reach this level of skills. Roughly, those of the skills 
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are confined to one-third for the cohort with ten or 
fifteen years of experience. And those who have 
been identified their potentials are encouraged to 
broaden their work experience not only to most 
positions in their workshop, but also to the next 
one in their career. It is from this skill group that 
the pilot members are supplied. Contrarily to an 
ordinary understanding that seniority commands 
Japanese workshops, tough competition between 
individual workers governs there.  
 
This is supported by the pay systems for the 
Japanese blue collar workers. Reverse to the common 
perception of the HRM people in Japan as well as 
other countries, the pay system for regular blue 
collar workers in Japanese industry is not for 
pay-for-job but for pay-for-job grade, basically 
similar for that of the white collar workers in both 
the West and Japan: yearly increments in base pay 
subject to merit rating are applied even for the 
regular blue collar workers. And this job grade 
system can well assess the workers skill level, in 
terms of the breadth of work experience, such as 
whether a worker can command most positions in 
the workshop at the level of conducting unusual 
operations. The pay system, thus, promotes blue 
collar workers skill development. 
 
    Second, development of information technology 
supports these activities of the pilot team. To have 
a voice in the conceptual stage of a new product 
design requires the know-how to understand the 
design chart. Till recent years, design charts have 
been only of a ground plan type, which necessitates 
a certain level of training for their understanding. 
Resultantly, this voice by production workers has 
been confined only to die-making workshops, 
where selected production workers are collected. 
This has been the finding of our field research in 
the middle 1990s (Koike, Chuma, and Ohta, 2001). 
Yet, new field research reveals this voice is now 
common even in ordinary workshops as those of the 
final assembly line, body welding, and others in 
general. This is clearly due to the development in 
IT: a virtual chart of three dimensions has made it 
feasible even for ordinary production workers to be 
able to understand the design chart and to describe 
their proposals cubicly. These workers skills would 
be extremely advantageous than those industries or 
countries where these are not available, since no 
design engineers have not such precious work 
experience of assembly operations.  
4.2 Participation in Designing New Production Line 
    Now we proceed to the next stage, in which 
pilot teams participate in designing a new 
production line. Here it is necessary to mention 
other members who cooperate with the pilot team. 
Two groups of engineers are to be noted; 
production engineers who are chiefly in charge of 
designing a new production line, locating in the 
headquarters of the firm, and manufacturing 
engineers who are in charge of tackling serious 
problems on mass production lines, locating at each 
factory. Although the production engineers play 
the central role in designing the production line, 
other two, manufacturing engineers and the pilot 
team, cooperate effectively. Let me describe this 
cooperation mostly from the view point of the pilot 
team. 
 
    Designing a production line is composed of the 
following five phases; A. designing a general 
concept of the line, such as whether to employ a 
U-shape line or a mass productive line, B. selecting 
equipments including major jigs and tools, C. how 
to deploy these equipments in order to attain best 
efficiency, D. how to divide the whole operations 
into individual jobs, and E. to teach production 
workers in the workshop how to conduct the new 
flow of operations.  
 
Phase A is naturally dominated by production 
engineers, though other two groups have their own 
voice. Even in Phase B production engineers still 
8  SKILL, VOICE, AND COMPETITIVENESS: INTEGRATING FIELD RESEARCH INTO LABOR ECONOMICS 
occupy the main role, though the voice of the other 
two groups become larger, since it is rather 
production workers who know better the actual 
performance of current machines and equipments 
because it is them who operate the equipments 
every day. And knowing current equipments is one 
of the most crucial sources in selecting new 
equipments. 
 
Phase C is the place where the pilot team 
plays an important role. At a glance, this role 
seems to be dominated by the production engineers 
or manufacturing engineers. Take for example the 
issue of how machines are to be deployed, however. 
Theoretical principles to be adopted are simple and 
clear: the shortest walking distance of an operator 
in charge of a series of machines, and the security 
of safety in operations. Suppose a case in which an 
operator handles several welding machines. Subject 
to the first principle, it is an imperative to deploy 
machines as near as possible. Yet, if machines are 
deployed too near, then there is possibility of work 
accident that should be prevented by the second 
principle. And this possibility heavily depends on 
the particular gesture of a particular operation that 
is the favorite of veteran production workers, not of 
engineers. 
 
Phases D and E are the places where the pilot 
team plays the major role. Those who know the 
actual operations best are undoubtedly the 
production workers, whose elite are the pilot team. 
Thus, they are most appropriate in designing each 
job on the new production line, though the whole 
number of manpower for that line is decided by the 
rule set by the headquarters. Needless to say, it is 
the pilot team members who teach the new 
operations to the fellow members in production 
workshops.   
  
All these activities stated above suggest the 
content and character of the highest grade of 
workers skills that I have named intellectual skills.  
５．Applicability 
Not Specific to Japanese Industry 
The workings of intellectual skills are not 
confined to an exceptional case like Toyota, but 
are commonly diffused as a most vital source of 
the competitiveness in Japanese industries. It is 
evidenced, though indirectly, by a comparative 
investigation of the rate of return from the 
overseas business activities, utilizing IMF 
Statistics that has been modified in classification 
since 1996 (Koike, 2008).    
 
    Applicability is not confined to Japanese 
industry only but to other countries. Rather, even 
the highest grade of workings of these systems can 
commonly be identified in the US, the UK, and 
Thailand, so far as Koike [2008] has revealed. The 
works of the pilot team are generally ascertained in 
Toyota factories in these countries. They have 
voice in the conceptual design of a new car model, 
and participate in the design of a new production 
line, though the grade might be less than Japanese 
one.  
 
Yet, there is a small difference by country in 
the working of pilot teams, or of intellectual skills, 
however: the grade of voice and of participation 
might, apart from Japanese cases, be slightly higher 
in Thai, NUMMI in the next, followed by the UK. 
There are several reasons why the grade differs 
though minutely. One is difference in the 
composition of the pilot team by country. For 
NUMMI in the US, strict seniority on the shop floor 
constrains to some extent the selection of members 
for the pilot team: best workers of production 
workshops are not necessarily chosen for the pilot 
team. Since pilot teams are the union members, 
selection process is not free from seniority. First it 
is subject to the volunteers for the pilot team, and 
among those volunteers, seniority shall govern. 
Moreover, those who have broad experience to 
cover most jobs in the workshop and even ones in 
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the next workshop are rarely available because of 
seniority on the shop floor. This difference in the 
composition of the pilot team naturally produces 
the variance in the performance of pilot teams. Yet, 
we cannot overestimate this fact in explaining the 
variance in the working of pilot teams by country, 
since the UK Toyota has no seniority now． 
 
A Long Period Required for Gain 
   By far more importantly, the difference in the 
period of overseas activities is to be noted, since 
this exactly reflects the variance in the grade of 
working of intellectual skills: Thai is the earliest, 
originated in the early 1960s, while NUMMI in 
1980s and the UK Toyota in 1990s. This suggests 
that a long period is needed until the date when 
Japanese overseas activities have been turned out 
gainful. Why does it need a long period for gain? 
 
In my understanding, the gainful working of 
intellectual skills depends largely on encouraging a 
large number of the middle level workers in any 
area of the globe. This requires a longer period to 
establish effective incentives to mobilize the vital 
people in the system, in comparison with alternatives 
such as mobilizing a small group of the excellent 
elite. For building up effective incentives, it would 
be common for both ways to show the precedent 
cases for followers to illustrate what performance 
and career guarantee for attaining promising 
positions in the organization. Yet, the time 
required for making promising precedents differs 
extremely between the two ways. For mobilizing a 
small number of the elite, it takes only one or two 
years to identify the candidates of high potentials 
and to show them the excellent precedents: once 
selected, quick promotions follow within a short 
period. To the contrary, it takes at least nearly ten 
years to identify promising members among the 
middle group, such as capable pilot team members: 
as pointed earlier, to identify the capable production 
workers for a pilot team, we need to let them 
experience most positions in the workshop that 
requires nearly ten years.  
 
In addition, persuasion opportunities are 
naturally by far less for the intellectual skills way 
than the elite one. For either way, written 
documents or formal rules are not sufficient for 
the candidates to be convinced of their promising 
future careers. Instead, informal persuasions are 
indispensable. Yet, for persuading a small group, 
informal opportunities can amply be available, 
such as home parties, while informal measures are 
almost unfeasible for a large number of the middle 
group. Consequently, it would be almost 
unavoidable to take a long period for the 
intellectual skill way, or Japanese way, to make 
and mobilize a large number of the capable middle 
group.    
 
Importance of Indirect Measurement 
    A final point of difficulty remains for the field 
research, that is, the one in measuring efficiency. 
Reminding of even the simplest case to identify the 
product defects again, no accurate measurement is 
available as explained earlier, though there is no 
doubt in surmising that this type of workers skills 
remarkably elevate productivity.  
 
A proposal is to make good use of an ordinary 
measurement, usually employed in quantitative 
analysis. Two implications could be emphasized. 
One is that, though they are indirect to prove the 
each step of reasoning itself, this strengthens an 
ordinary measurement in the sense that this is 
backed up with more persuasive reasoning 
disclosed by in-depth field research, and that it 
makes possible for other firms to utilize the way of 
intellectual skills. The other is that the new theory 
suggested by field research can be supported with 
some evidence.  
 
 
Appendix: The Major Components of Intellectual 
Skills 
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To list up 
     According to a series of field research, we 
can list up the major workings of intellectual skills 
as follows: 
 
A. Dealing with problems, consisting of: 
A1. Dealing with problems in quality of product, 
subdivided into: 
A11. Identifying the defects in product quality 
A12. Identifying the cause of defects 
A13. Rectifying the defects 
A2. Dealing with trouble in equipment 
A21. Identifying trouble in equipment 
A22. Identifying the cause of trouble in 
equipment 
A23. Rectifying trouble in equipment. 
B. Dealing with changes, subdivided as follows: 
B1. Dealing with changes in labor mix 
B2. Dealing with changes in product mix 
B3. Dealing with changes in output 
B4. Dealing with changes in production methods 
B41. Dealing with designing a new production 
line 
B42. Dealing with designing a new model of 
product 
 
Since A11 and B4 have been explained in the main 
text, other types need to be explained though 
shortly. 
 
A: Dealing with problems 
    Identifying the causes of defects in product 
quality (A12) is more crucial to productivity than 
identifying the defects in product quality (A11). 
Without this know-how, defects can repeatedly 
occur. If the causes of defects are not identified and 
accordingly not rectified, machinery continues to 
produce defective parts; and if operators stop 
machinery for fear of producing defective parts, 
production is naturally halted. In contrast, when 
the operator can identify the causes of defects and 
rectify them (A13), the difference in productivity 
can be remarkable. 
    This know-how (A12) requires a higher level 
of knowledge than the case of simply recognizing 
that there is a defect (A11). In order to identify the 
cause of defects, it is necessary to know the 
machinery structure and the production mechanism, 
because any trouble in the machinery or in the flow 
of production may cause defects in product quality. 
And this knowledge becomes the more demanding 
as machinery structure and flow of production 
becomes more ever complicated with the use of 
information technology and robots. 
   An example from another assembly-line 
workshop fully equipped with many robots of small 
size may serve to illustrate the point when 
robotization develops. This is a workshop in one of 
the largest part suppliers in the Toyota group. 
Sixteen workers under one foreman are engaged 
over two shifts in assembling small electric motors 
with almost two dozen small robots as well as 
automatic machinery. Automatic machinery and 
robots carry out most of the assembly work, and 
the only remaining operations for the workers are 
dealing with problems. Dealing with changes in 
products is not demanding here, since robots 
automatically handle changes in products; 
censoring the bar codes on products instructs 
certain products to pass through a specific robot, 
and the others to be assembled by the robots. 
When a machine or robot finds something wrong, 
the machinery stops and a sign lights up to call for 
an operator (Koike, Chuma, and Ohta, 2001, 
pp.43-59.).  
    Here, the ability to deal with equipment such 
as robots is vital in handling defective products, or, 
in other words, dealing with defects in products 
(A1) becomes inseparable from dealing with trouble 
in equipment (A2). Since assembling itself is almost 
done by machines and robots, most defects are due 
to some kind of equipment trouble. Take, for 
example, a problem in this workshop where 
products do not flow smoothly at a certain spot. 
Immediately after the worker in charge of that job 
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has become aware of the slower flow, he or she tries 
to identify the cause. It is the practice of this 
workshop that the worker on the assembly line first 
tries to identify the cause rather than the 
maintenance people. And either defects in product 
or trouble in equipment can be the cause (A12 or 
A22). To take the above example, the slower 
product flow may be due to defects in products 
such as a smallest part being not correctly attached, 
which prevents products passing the censor, or it 
may be caused by problem in the censor itself or 
something else. 
It is also the practice of this workshop that an 
operator tries, if feasible, to rectify it before 
maintenance people have arrived (A13 or B23). As 
it takes around 15 minutes for the maintenance 
people to come, the ability of workers to handle 
problems greatly contributes to efficiency.  
 
B. Dealing with change 
    The easiest component of intellectual skills is 
the ability to deal with changes in labor mix (B1). 
Two cases are illustrative. One is a need to 
substitute for absent workers in the workshop. On 
a continuous assembly line, even one vacant 
position stops the whole line. Consequently, it is 
imperative to have workers who can substitute for 
many positions in the workshop. This necessity is 
of course common in any assembly line in any 
country. In the USA, these substitutes, called 
‘relief men’ or‘utility men’, are paid at a slightly 
higher rate than others in the workshop.  
    The other case is the need to teach less 
experienced workers in the workshop. It is common 
that a workshop has newcomers to replace those 
who have quit or retired. New workers need 
instruction to become accustomed to even the 
easiest jobs in the workshop and, thus, veteran 
workers who can instruct them are required. This 
capability to teach newcomers is an element of 
intellectual skills. 
    Another easiest element of intellectual skills is 
to deal with changes in product mix (B2). Changing 
consumer demand both for quantity and kinds may 
require one assembly line to accommodate various 
kinds of products. While small changes in the kinds 
of product need few jigs and tool changes, other 
changes require workers to change jigs and tools, 
which sometimes necessitate far higher skills than 
usual operations. When skilled workers change jigs 
and tools, not only must they undertake the 
exchange quickly, but also accurately, to obviate 
defects. This feature constitutes another 
component of intellectual skills. 
 
Dealing with changes in output 
    More demanding component of the intellectual 
skills is the ability to deal with changes in output 
(B3). Demand for products sometimes changes 
significantly. If production does not sufficiently 
adjust to the quantitative change in demand, the 
firm’s profits will surely be damaged. Yet efficient 
adjustment on the shop floor is difficult unless the 
workers have acquired the two components of high 
skills required for making adjustments: namely, 
many of them being capable of doing most 
operations in the workshop, and some being so 
skilful that a redistribution of the operation into 
each job in the workshop is feasible.    
    The redistribution process is a famous part of 
the Toyota systems that has now been diffused 
widely into other industries. When demand 
decreases by 20%, for example, Toyota decreases 
the speed of production by 20% from, say, 60 
seconds to 72 seconds for making one unit of car. 
(If the extent of change is smaller, an adjustment in 
working hours would be enough to accommodate 
the change.) A simple slow down in the speed of the 
manufacturing line results in an increase in costs. 
To prevent this cost increase Toyota naturally tries 
to reduce the number of workers in a workshop by 
20%, say from 15 persons to 12. Yet no decrease in 
the kinds of operations should be made; if this were 
the case, cars without a left side door, for example, 
could appear. Suppose there have been 60 
operations in the workshop carried out by 15 
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workers before and these operations now have to 
be done by 12 workers. This cannot be implemented 
unless many workers who can conduct many 
different operations in the workshop. Redistribution 
would not be feasible simply by adding 20% more 
operations to each individual worker, because each 
operation differs in length of time required when 
difficulties arise. Thus, the content of intellectual 
skills is, in this case, a capability of doing many 
difficult operations in the workshop at the level of 
not damaging the quality as well as the seed of 
production. 
    The more demanding element of know-how to 
deal with this change is the one required to conduct 
a redistribution of the operations, which needs two 
components of knowledge. One is to know well the 
features of all the operations in the workshop: how 
difficult or easy they are, and what the order should 
be in assembling. Another is to know the skill levels 
of individual members in the workshop who can 
currently conduct these operations. The best 
people with this knowledge are undoubtedly the 
veteran members of the workshop, since without 
having worked together there would be no 
opportunity afforded to know individual skill levels. 
This observation is a highly typical example of 
Hayek’s ‘specific knowledge.’ If, instead, an engineer 
were to conduct the redistribution, the result would 
definitely be worse, since the engineer lacks 
sufficient knowledge due to not having worked with 
the workshop members on daily basis. 
Notes: 
1) The concept of intellectual skills is not originated in 
the field survey of car workshops, rather of other 
various industries. Yet, it would be more convenient 
to take examples from car industry for better 
understanding of readers.  
      The origin of this concept is my comparative field 
work between the US and Japanese manufacturing 
workshops during the 1970’, whose results were 
published as Koike [1977] in Japanese and as Koike 
[1988] in English. Yet, the development of my concept 
was only partially, that is, simply in terms of breadth 
of work experience not in terms of depth. This latter 
part is well developed in my comparative field work 
between endogenous Thai and Malaysian workshops 
and endogenous Japanese ones conducted with 
collaboration of Profs. Inoki and Fujimura in the 
middle of the 1980’, the results of which were 
published as Koike & Inoki [1987] in Japanese and 
Koike & Inoki [1990] in English. 
      Yet, the concept of the highest grade for 
intellectual skills, workers voice in the design of a new 
product has been disclosed in my field work that 
compares four Toyota Works, Thailand, the US , the 
UK, and Japan, published as Koike [2008] only in 
Japanese. 
  
2) Toyota allows formally a part of production workers to 
deal with problems, provided they have acquired a 
company certificate of problem-handling. To obtain 
this certificate, it is necessary for a candidate to 
succeed in the test to rectifying the trouble artificially 
caused in machines in the workshop conducted after 
working hours, along with participating in a two days 
class room lecture. Yet, certification holders are 
practically confined to a small minority, and it would 
be unfeasible for a worker to have experienced of 
tackling trouble in practice before acquiring the 
certificate. This naturally results in a larger part of 
those workers who can deal with problems in practice. 
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